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[Appearing below is the first of a two-article series. The second article will be published in the
09/25/91 issue of the Central America Update.] . Robinson The government of President Violeta
Barrios de Chamorro is facing its most serious crisis since April 1990. The imbroglio brings
together three closely related developments. First, the non-Sandinista political bloc in Nicaragua is
undergoing a realignment, involving disintegration of efforts to forge a "political center" under the
wings of Violeta Chamorro's presidency, new divisions within the government, and confrontation
between the executive and legislative branches which confers a constitutional dimension to the
crisis. Second, the shifting political landscape has been both highlighted and accelerated by the
explosive issue of property ownership, which is the very crux of the conflicts that have plagued
Nicaragua since the change of government from the Sandinista to the Chamorro administration.
Third is the specter of renewed military conflict, a major factor in the national equation. In recent
weeks, the "recontras", or former contras who have again taken up arms, have escalated military
actions and moved from isolated groups in the countryside to a movement now clearly linked
with political factions in the government. The first year: shifting political landscape Two key
actors in Nicaragua's latest political drama are Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo (known as the
government's "de facto Prime Minister"), who is also Chamorro's son-in-law, and Alfredo Cesar,
the illustrious and ambitious president of the National Assembly and Lacayo's brother-in-law. The
governing alliance in Nicaragua, the National Opposition Union (UNO), was hastily assembled
with US funds and political guidance as an anti-Sandinista electoral coalition. Although UNO won
the February 1990 elections with about 58% of the votes, the amalgam of 14 parties was never a
coherent or unified group. During the 1989-1990 electoral process, Cesar was Chamorro's campaign
manager and Lacayo, her principal electoral adviser. After the vote, the two quickly formed a
powerful and tightknit duo around the president, with Lacayo assuming the reigns of the executive
office and Cesar operating from within the legislature. Within weeks of the new government's
April 1990 inauguration, the UNO split into two camps. The president's inner circle of moderate
"technocrats," led by the Lacayo- Cesar duo, formed the so-called "Las Palmas" group. This group,
while controlling the executive, also won the allegiance of five of the 14 parties that made up the
UNO coalition. The remaining nine parties coalesced into the "El Carmen" group, under the
leadership of Vice President Virgilio Godoy. This group aligned with the extreme right Superior
Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), and began forging a right-wing bloc, headquartered in
the legislature. Behind the split were competing strategies on how to deal with the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN) which remains the largest and best organized party in the country
and the singular most influential political force in society and on how to reorganize the state and
the economy after 10 years of revolutionary transformation. The technocrats of the Las Palmas
group, epitomized by Lacayo, emerged during the 1980s calling for modernization and agroindustrialization efforts in the framework of the Sandinistas' mixed economy. In 1988, Lacayo
and his followers broke off from COSEP and formed a new business group, CORDENIC, which
supported the peace process and entered into negotiations with the then-governing Sandinistas.
CORDENIC's view was that the revolution could become more moderate and reformed from
within through participation of private capital. Having won the elections and gained control of
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the executive, the technocrats seek to build upon foundations laid by the Sandinistas, including
an economic structure liberated from the more backward oligarchic class of rentiers and a more
modern state apparatus. In retaking "concertacion" efforts introduced by the Sandinistas, they
also want to govern through mechanisms of political mediation and negotiation as a means of
establishing social consensus and stability. In the economic arena, the objective is to promote a
post-oligarchic, post-revolutionary modernization tailored to Nicaragua's unique conditions, and
in the context of the neo-liberal restructuring taking place throughout the region. In the political
sphere, their program is to erode the influence of Sandinismo from state and society by gradual
political attrition of the left, reform and cooptation (i.e., taming, not tackling, the Sandinista lion).
For its part, the El Carmen group has been a mixed bag of maverick politicians, such as the brash
but adept Godoy, and representatives from the old oligarchy and traditional parties. Their platform
has been violent confrontation with the Sandinistas and a crude restoration of the pre- revolutionary
status quo through the quick and thorough rollback of revolutionary programs and institutions.
In the first year of the new government, the two blocs often fought more acrimoniously between
themselves than with the Sandinistas. With Lacayo virtually running the executive and the powerful
Cesar representing executive interests in the legislature, the Chamorro presidency was able to fend
off repeated, and sometimes violent, attempts by the right to impose its agenda on the government
and shift the executive in a sharply rightward direction. Meanwhile, the left went through its
own reorganization since the elections. The FSLN experienced a crisis of morale after its electoral
defeat. The trade union and popular movements emerged as powerful new actors independent
of the Sandinistas, often taking to the streets to block the rightist agenda and preserve the social
transformations of the revolution. This volatile alignment of political forces left, right and a weak
center easily manipulated by pressures from either side had characterized post-electoral Nicaraguan
politics until a few months ago. Cesar split with Lacayo and moved to the right, undermining the
executive and encouraging the right to take the offensive against the FSLN and the Chamorro
administration. In addition, the Sandinistas held their first national party congress in July. Contrary
to the hopes of many on the right and the confident predictions of several political officers at the
US Embassy the FSLN did not fracture. The party emerged united, rejuvenated and belligerent
from the congress, which symbolized an end to the "period of mourning" following electoral defeat.
The project of a political center Lacayo, who describes himself as a social democrat but belongs to
no political party, had often referred to Cesar as his "political partner." In an interview with the
Nicaraguan weekly El Semanario in late 1990, Lacayo said his "entrance" into politics was in large
part due to Cesar's influence: "Since 1982, we have been developing together our political thought,
and in fact Violeta Chamorro's candidacy was masterminded by the two of us. Many of our ideas
have been maturing since then in conversations that Alfredo and I have sustained throughout
these years, with the general idea of forming a political center in Nicaragua." A political center
never had the chance to develop under the Somoza dictatorship, which polarized society between
the right and the revolutionary left, said Lacayo. According to the Lacayo-Cesar scheme, a social
democratic center would gradually attract the more moderate elements within the FSLN, thus
weakening the left, as well as moderates from the right, along with the CORDENIC technocrats
and businesspeople. In Lacayo's perspective, the period between the 1990 and the 1996 elections
was to be a "transition" to the "consolidation of democracy" and the emergence of the political
center. There was only one hitch to Lacayo's scheme for the 1990-1996 transition. Alfredo Cesar's
understanding of things was that he was to become president in 1996, and he has made no effort
to hide such ambitions. In an April 1990 interview with the New York Times, for instance, Cesar
confirmed that his ultimate objective was the presidential office, adding that "politics and ethics
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don't always mix" if one is to achieve political ambitions. In contrast to Lacayo and the CORDENIC
crowd, Cesar is less the technocratic businessperson than the savvy and adroit politician, with a
long history of wheeling and dealing in Nicaraguan politics. Cesar left his post as general manager
of the San Antonio sugar mill in 1978 to join the Sandinista- led insurrection against the Somoza
dictatorship. In 1979, he established the Social Democratic Party (PSD), and was invited by the
Sandinistas to participate in the post-Somoza government, first as secretary of the transitional
government junta, and then as president of the Central Bank. Cesar resigned from the latter position
in 1981 to exile himself in Costa Rica where he joined the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance
(ARDE) contra group headed by Eden Pastora. In 1985, he broke with Pastora to form his own contra
group, the "Opposition Block of the South" (BOS). According to an associate, Arturo Cruz Jr., at
the time Cesar "began receiving funding for his activities from the CIA." Cruz said the CIA "was
happy to be doing business with Alfredo Cesar." With his command of English and impeccable
attire, the Stanford-educated Cesar also became a favorite in Washington, where he cemented ties
with the State Department's Inter- American desk and with members of the Congress. In 1987,
Cesar became a member of the Nicaraguan Resistance directorate. From that post, he entered into
secret, unilateral negotiations with the Sandinistas over his return to Managua to participate in
the 1989 electoral process. Paul Reichler, a US attorney serving as legal adviser to the government,
and who represented the Sandinistas in secret negotiations with Cesar, the latter expressed "one
ambition, one overriding passion to be president of Nicaragua." Cesar has thus demonstrated an
uncanny skill in forming and then breaking alliances with almost anyone. This behavior has earned
Cesar the ignominious nick-name in Nicaragua of "Siete Cuchillos," literally Seven Daggers, or the
"Backstabber." It would seem, in light of his background, that Cesar's break with Lacayo is his most
recent betrayal. But why "stab" Lacayo's back? Cesar's gamble By early 1991, it was becoming clear
to Cesar that two things threatened his political ambitions. First, Lacayo's personal popularity had
been steadily increasing. The hard-working Lacayo has gained the image as peacemaker for his
leadership role in the reconciliation and "concertacion" processes, and won approval for securing
assistance in the government's difficult negotiations with foreign creditors. (See "The Nicaraguan
Economy: `Mother of all Migraines,'" 03/29/91 issue of CAU.) Several public opinion surveys carried
out last spring by a Costa Rican polling firm, Borges and Associates, showed that Lacayo had
become the second most popular figure in the country, after President Chamorro, with an approval
rating of over 60%. While Daniel Ortega scored over 50% in these polls, as the third most popular
figure, Cesar garnered a disappointing 30%. Second, political polarization in Nicaragua had been
exacerbated. The right was gaining momentum in its attacks against the burgeoning trade union
and grassroots movements and the FSLN. Cesar was not the only one to recognize the implications
of the polarization. FSLN Deputy Rafael Solis warned that the polarization process threatened to
undercut both the left (the FSLN), and the center (the technocratic executive), to the advantage
of the right's "Napoleonic project." In brief, Cesar found himself outflanked by his own "political
partner," Lacayo, in the center, and losing space to an insurgent right. Cesar's agenda became
clear: move into the space being opened up by the right, eclipse Virgilio Godoy and other rightist
political figures, undercut Lacayo by seizing the initiative, and forge a reconfigured center-right
bloc under his own leadership. Such bloc would become Cesar's platform for pursuing his political
ambitions. Since endorsement by the US Embassy is considered essential in traditional Nicaraguan
politics, Cesar also felt obligated to win US support for his ambitions. In March, Lacayo contracted
Reichler's office to advise the Nicaraguan government in its efforts to mediate in the Salvadoran
conflict. In Washington, conservative congresspersons protested the decision. In Managua, Cesar
came out publicly in favor of the US protest, forcing Lacayo to cancel the contract. A few days later,
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Cesar's wife and Lacayo's sister, Sylvia Lacayo, announced her resignation from the post of Treasury
director "in solidarity" with her husband, and because "the government must fulfill its electoral
promises." Cesar then began systematic opposition to the executive's initiatives submitted to the
legislature, including public statements against the executive, and introduction of his own bills.
Cesar's legislative initiatives correspond to demands by Virgilio Godoy, COSEP and the rest of the
El Carmen group since the Chamorro government was installed. Cesar nearly forced Chamorro to
veto the 1991 budget by insisting, together with the right, on a drastic reduction in appropriations
for the army. The military budget had already been cut by over 100%. Lacayo said further cuts
in military financing would have "destabilizing effects" on the tenuous accommodation among
political forces. According to one of Cesar's aides, who requested anonymity, Cesar also began
regular and frequent lunches with US Ambassador Harry Shlauderman and other US diplomats.
Not surprisingly, Cesar himself, with much fanfare, introduced a bill in the National Assembly in
March to revoke legislation obligating the Nicaraguan government to seek compensation payments
as part of the World Court suit against Washington. For months, the right had insisted on dropping
the World Court case, and rumor had it that the US government required such a move to release
economic aid. Center-right and center-left? With Lacayo betrayed by his "political partner," he
has been left alone holding the strings of the "political center project" he and Cesar spent 10 years
dreaming up. Some Sandinistas have argued that the Chamorro government is inherently weak, and
prone to vacillate between conservative and progressive positions depending on the constellation
of political pressures at a particular moment. With a collapsing center and a resurgent right, it
would seem that Lacayo and his inner circle within the executive have no place to turn but to the
left, or towards deepening the working relationship with the Sandinistas that has been developing
over the past year. Lacayo's political and economic agenda is decidedly not revolutionary, nor
Sandinista. However, he shares the Sandinistas' hallmark political pragmatism and realism. Under
prevailing polarization conditions in Nicaragua, Lacayo has more in common with the FSLN than
the reconfigured right headed by Cesar. Lacayo's pragmatism would seem to have been confirmed
by his appearance as a special guest speaker at the closing plenary session of the FSLN national
congress in July. He said, "Looking into the future, there is clearly more that unites than separates
us." Little more than a year ago, Lacayo was at the helm of a bitter election campaign against the
FSLN. Battle lines and alliances in Nicaraguan politics are bound to change many times over in
the coming months. Numerous additional permutations are expected before the next national
elections, which could be held as early as 1994. Cesar and the property issue Meanwhile, against
the backdrop of this shifting political landscape, the most explosive issue in Nicaragua today is
property ownership. And this is the issue on which Cesar has placed his bets. After several months
of rapid-fire initiatives against the executive and in line with the right, Cesar tackled the property
issue head on. From his position as president of the National Assembly, he appointed himself to
head a "property commission" to make recommendations on resolution of this highly controversial
issue.

-- End --
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